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Policy, Past and Future 
Theda Skocpol 
Debates about fundamental reworkings of national social policy are at the cen- 
ter of U.S. politics-and  are likely to remain there for the foreseeable future. 
As the turn of a new century approaches, American are looking critically at the 
scope and purposes of their nation’s  social policies. Reconsiderations  are in- 
spired by the changing needs of  a national population that includes increasing 
numbers of elderly people, employed mothers, low-wage workers not making 
incomes sufficient to support families, and employees without long-term job 
security. Yet  today’s policy discussions also grow out of unresolved political 
disputes from the past. Today’s debates are new incarnations of ongoing battles 
over the expansion, contraction, or reorganization of public services and social 
spending in the United States. 
Some debates are certainly hardy perennials. “Welfare reform,” for example, 
has come up at least once a decade since the 1950s (Bane and Ellwood 1994, 
chap. l), and President Bill Clinton’s boldly declared intention to “end welfare 
as we know it” is only the most recent version of a long-standing aspiration to 
substitute wage-earning jobs for dependency  by  the poor  on public aid. Of 
course today’s version of “welfare reform” is informed by heightened worries 
about the growing numbers of single-mother-led families in America (Garfin- 
kel and McLanahan 1986).  Have governmental policies encouraged this trend? 
What reformed  or new policies might encourage the stability of two-parent 
families and offer appropriate support for single-parent families? 
Concerns about social protections for the elderly also recur, and nowadays 
they are sometimes coupled with calls to reorient our public policies toward 
“helping America’s children,” The rapidly rising cost of Medicare is decried 
by pundits and politicians, even as the elderly and many of their family mem- 
bers are asking for new public help to defray the costs of prescription drugs 
Theda Skocpol is professor of  government and sociology at Harvard University. 
309 310  Theda Skocpol 
and long-term care for the partially or fully disabled. At the same time, conser- 
vatives argue that existing programs such as Social Security and Medicare are 
“too costly.” According to the Concord Coalition (Peterson 1993), the United 
States is certain to “go bankrupt,” and “our children and grandchildren” will 
be deprived of a chance to realize the American Dream, unless there are large 
cuts soon in taxation  and spending for such “middle-class entitlements” as 
Social Security and Medicare. 
The Concord Coalition has predominantly conservative backing and appeal, 
yet some of its arguments are meant to appeal to progressives. Some liberals 
are, in fact, willing to contemplate cuts in programs for the elderly out of des- 
peration to free up tax resources to aid children  and working-age  families. 
Reviving a reform strategy used in earlier eras of American history, contempo- 
rary liberal groups such as the Children’s Defense Fund dramatize the needs of 
the young (cf. Children’s Defense Fund 1994). Pointing to rising rates of child 
poverty, children’s advocates call for expanded public commitments to ensuring 
family health services, education, and day care. 
Somewhat more surprising than ever-revisited public discussions about re- 
forming welfare and ensuring security for the elderly and children has been 
the recent reconsideration of the U.S. federal role in health care. The issue of 
comprehensive health reform had all but disappeared from the national agenda 
after the late 1970s. Experts still worried about problems of access and rising 
costs, but politicians had given up on debating grand solutions after the Demo- 
crats under Jimmy Carter failed to make headway on health reform, and after 
conservative victories in the 1980s apparently made it impossible to talk about 
major new governmental ventures. 
Then, in the fall of 1991, an obscure Democratic candidate, Harris Wofford, 
overcame a forty-point deficit in the opinion polls to win a special senatorial 
election in  Pennsylvania  (Blumenthal  1991; Russakoff  1991). Wofford ran 
television commercials promising that he would work for health insurance cov- 
ering every American, and his surprise victory over a well-established Republi- 
can opponent was widely attributed to this emphasis on universal insurance. 
Suddenly, electoral politicians awoke to the worries about health coverage that 
were spreading among middle-class citizens (Starr 1991), who no longer feel 
secure about their jobs and employment-based benefits. 
During his campaign for the presidency in 1992, Democratic candidate Bill 
Clinton picked up on the theme of comprehensive health care reform, even as 
he highlighted the need for new national policies to promote employment and 
economic growth (Clinton and Gore 1992). After President Clinton assumed 
office in January 1993, officials in his administration and task forces assembled 
around its edges set to work devising bold new plans for reworking America’s 
social and economic policies. Some steps were taken quickly and quietly, such 
as the summer 1993 expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit to boost the 
incomes of low-wage working families (Howard 1994). In other areas, such as 
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run up against draconian budgetary constraints that will probably prevent their 
full  implementation.  Democratic  candidate  Clinton  had,  after  all, not  only 
promised  to reinvigorate national economic  and social policies; he had also 
promised to cut the national budget deficit and trim back taxes for the broad 
American middle class. 
Even in the face of powerful budgetary  and political constraints, Clinton 
chose to stake much of his presidential prestige on a comprehensive “health 
security plan”  unveiled  in  the fall  of  1993 (White House  Domestic  Policy 
Council  1993). Echoing themes of universal protection reminiscent of former 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s legislation for Social Security during the New 
Deal, President Clinton unabashedly hopes to make the 1990s a watershed for 
U.S. public social provision comparable to that of the 1930s. As the president 
declared in his September 22, 1993, speech to the Congress and the nation: 
It’s hard to believe that once there was a time-even  in this century-when 
retirement was nearly synonymous with poverty, and older Americans died 
in our streets. That is unthinkable  today because  over half  a century ago 
Americans had the courage to change-to  create a Social Security system 
that ensures that no Americans will be forgotten in their later years. 
I believe  that forty years  from now our grandchildren  will  also find it 
unthinkable that there was a time in our country when hard-working families 
lost their homes and savings simply because their child fell ill, or lost their 
health coverage  when they changed jobs. Yet  our grandchildren  will only 
find such things unthinkable  tomorrow  if  we have the courage to change 
today. 
This is our change. This is our journey. And when our work is done, we 
will have answered the call of history and met the challenge of our times. 
Stirring presidential rhetoric aside, the specific proposals put forward in late 
1993 by the Clinton administration were rejected or withdrawn not long after 
Congress began to consider them. No health care reforms at all were enacted 
prior to the congressional elections of November 1994, and any proposals rein- 
troduced by the Clinton administration in 1995 are certain to be fundamentally 
reworked  before anything becomes law. This is true not only for health care 
reform, but also for proposed changes in welfare, employment programs, and 
programs  dealing with  the needs of  working  families.  Still, no matter how 
much-or  how little-actually  happens during the (one- or two-term) presi- 
dency of Bill Clinton, fundamental issues are not going to go away. Financing 
health care, caring for an aging population,  retraining displaced employees, 
putting welfare mothers to work, alleviating child poverty or substandard nur- 
turance,  and making  employment  sustainable along with parenthood  for all 
American families-all  of these matters and more will require repeated atten- 
tion  from presidents,  congressional  representatives,  state and  local  govern- 
ments, and citizens. Well into the early twenty-first century, the United States 
seems certain to be reconsidering and revising its public social policies. 312  Theda Skocpol 
11.1  Understanding U.S. Social Policy Making 
So how are we to make sense of the making and remaking of social policies 
in the United  States? Many people would answer this query timelessly-in 
moral-ideological  terms, or in supposedly  value-neutral  technical terms. For 
moralists, battles over U.S. social policy may be seen as clashes between advo- 
cates of “big government” versus “the market,” or as combat between  those 
who want to economically  aid the needy  versus those  who want to  control 
and reform their behavior. Meanwhile, for many professional  experts, policy 
making is understood  as a matter of doing objective research  on the extent 
of societal problems, in order to devise optimal cost-efficient “solutions” for 
politicians to enact. 
Moralists and technocrats thus look at social policy making in very different 
ways. But they have in common an almost total lack of historical and political 
sensibility.  Both moralists  and technocrats  tend to look at policy  formation 
outside of the context of America’s historically changing governmental institu- 
tions, and without reference to broader political tendencies and alliances. Con- 
sequently, moralists are unable to understand why their version of “good’ tri- 
umphs or fails to triumph over “evil” at any given moment. And technically 
oriented policy experts feel no responsibility  to consider matters of govern- 
mental feasibility, or to take responsibility when the “efficient” solutions they 
propose either are not accepted, or lead to unintended and unwanted outcomes. 
The lack of historical and political sensibility is, in a way, quite comfortable 
for moralists and technocrats  alike. In the face of political failures, moralists 
can simply redouble their shrill, absolutist cries for good versus evil. And tech- 
nocrats can retreat to academia or think tanks and continue working out perfect 
solutions  for unnamed future politicians  to adopt-with  unforeseen  conse- 
quences, for which the experts need take no responsibility. What moralists and 
technocrats both fail to achieve, however, are reliable insights into the political 
constraints  and possibilities for making and remaking American public poli- 
cies at any given historical juncture, including the present. 
Even in a volume such as this, where most contributions appropriately focus 
on the technical and normative dimensions of ideal social policies, there is a 
place for a historically grounded analysis of the politics of social policy mak- 
ing. That is what this essay offers. It includes, first, an overview of the politics 
of U.S. social policy making from the nineteenth century to the present, and 
then a set of reflections on the lessons we might take from political history 
about constraints and possibilities at work in contemporary debates about so- 
cial policies for the future. 
11.2  The Political Formation of U.S. Social Policy 
Modem “welfare states,” as they eventually came to be called, had their start 
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established for industrial workers and needy citizens in Europe and Australasia 
(Flora and Alber  1981). Later, from the  1930s through the  1950s, such pro- 
grammatic beginnings were in certain countries elaborated into comprehensive 
systems of income support and social insurance encompassing entire national 
populations.  In the aftermath  of World War 11,  Great Britain rationalized  a 
whole array of services and social insurance programs around an explicit vi- 
sion of “the welfare state,” which would ensure a “national minimum” of pro- 
tection for all citizens against income interruptions due to old age, disability, 
ill health, unemployment, and family breakup. During the same period, other 
nations-especially  the  Scandinavian  democracies-established  “full  em- 
ployment welfare states” by deliberately coordinating social policies, first with 
Keynesian strategies of  macroeconomic management  and then with targeted 
interventions in labor markets. 
Comparative research on the origins of modern  welfare states often mea- 
sures the United States against foreign patterns of “welfare state development.” 
In such research, America is labeled a “welfare state laggard”  because it did 
not establish nationwide social insurance until  1935, and an “incomplete wel- 
fare state” because  it never enacted national health insurance or established 
full-employment programs coordinated  with social policies. Certain insights 
can be gained from comparisons of this sort. But they overlook important so- 
cial policies that were distinctive to the United States in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, and direct our attention away from recurrent patterns 
in U.S. social policy and the political forces that have shaped and reshaped it 
over time. As 1  have argued in Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political 
Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Skocpol 1992), it is important to 
break  with  the  evolutionism  and  the  socioeconomic  determinism  of  most 
social-scientific research on the development of Western welfare states, partic- 
ularly if one’s objective is to understand U.S. social policies and politics. 
Modern U.S. social policies did not start with the Social Security Act  of 
1935. Between the  1870s and the 1920s, U.S. federal and state governments 
established many policies aiming to protect, first, veteran Union soldiers and 
their dependents, and then mothers and their children. I label the first two (of- 
ten-overlooked) eras of modem U.S. social policy the “Civil War era” and the 
“maternalist era.” Recent eras are better known: the “New Deal era,” and what 
I shall tentatively label the “era of controversies over the federal social role,” 
which stretches from the 1960s to the present. 
To  make sense of these major phases of modem U.S. social provision from 
the Civil War  to the present, I use a polity-centered  theoretical  framework, 
devised in critical dialogue with alternative social scientific theories that em- 
phasize the sociodemographic, cultural, or class determinants of public social 
policies (for a survey of theories,  see Skocpol and Amenta  1986). An essay 
such as this is hardly  the place to go into great detail about this explanatory 
approach (for a full discussion of which see Skocpol 1992, introduction), but 
I can indicate its chief features. 314  Theda Skocpol 
I analyze social policy making in the context of the historical development 
of  changing U.S.  governmental  institutions,  political  parties,  and  electoral 
rules. The United States started  out with  a federally  decentralized  “state of 
courts and parties” (Skowronek 1982), in which there were no centralized pro- 
fessionally  run  public  bureaucracies.  Instead,  courts,  legislatures,  and 
patronage-oriented  political parties held sway, with the parties competing for 
votes in the world’s first mass democracy  for males.  Only around 1900 did 
U.S. governments at local, state, and federal levels begin to develop significant 
bureaucratic capacities. This happened as patronage parties and electoral com- 
petition weakened. Yet public bureaucratization in the United States has always 
proceeded in fragmentary ways, and the United States has never developed a 
strong, well-paid, or highly respected stratum of national civil servants. Nor is 
there any clear concentration of centralized governmental power in the United 
States. Divisions of authority among executives, agencies, legislatures, com- 
mittees within legislatures, and state and federal courts are arguably even more 
pervasive  within  twentieth-century  U.S.  governance  than  they  were  in 
nineteenth-century party-dominated politics. What is more, U.S. national poli- 
tics has always been rooted  in congressionally  mediated coalitions of local 
interests. From the time of patronage-oriented  party politics in the nineteenth 
century, down to the more bureaucratically centered coalitions of today, public 
programs have an easier time of being enacted in U.S. national politics, and of 
surviving, if they distribute benefits, services, or regulatory advantages widely, 
across large numbers of local legislative districts. 
To  make sense of patterns of policy making in each major era, I consider 
the impact of changing U.S. governmental and electoral arrangements on the 
initiatives taken by officials and politicians. These political actors take initia- 
tives of their own, and look for policies that will further their careers within 
given organizational contexts. I also look at the impact of institutional arrange- 
ments on the identities, goals, and capacities of the various social groups that 
have become active, at one period or another, in political alliances contending 
over the shape of U.S. public policies. Finally, my polity-oriented perspective 
highlights “policy feedbacks” over time: the influences that earlier social poli- 
cies have upon the institutional arrangements and social groups that shape later 
social policies. Not only does politics make policies, the opposite is also true: 
policies make, and subsequently remake, politics, either by changing the fiscal 
and administrative capacities of government or by encouraging (or frustrating) 
group demands or alliances in the electorate and representative bodies. 
Let me briefly illustrate how I use this sort of institutionalist, polity-centered 
framework to analyze patterns of policy and the politics that shaped them from 
the Civil War to the present. My treatment of each period here is breathtakingly 
succinct, but readers can easily find fuller elaborations of analytic framework 
and empirical discussions  in other publications  by  me and my collaborators 
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11.2.1  The Civil War Era 
Early American “social policy” included state and local support for the most 
extensive and inclusive system of primary,  secondary, and higher education 
in the industrializing  world (Heidenheimer 198  1; Rubinson  1986). Less well 
known, but  even more telling, early U.S. social provision featured generous 
local, state, and (especially) federal benefits for Civil War veterans and their 
dependents. From the  1870s to the 1910s, there was an enormous expansion 
of disability, survivors’, and de facto old-age benefits for veterans of the Union 
armies of the Civil War (for full details and documentation, see Skocpol 1992, 
chap. 2). By 1910, about 28% of all elderly American  men, and nearly one- 
third of elderly men in the North, were receiving from the U.S. government 
pensions that were remarkably generous by the international  standards of the 
day; many widows and other dependents of deceased veterans were also pen- 
sioners; and extra aid from state and local governments was often available to 
Civil War veterans and survivors. Union soldiers and their dependents, it was 
argued, had “saved the Nation” and should in return be cared for by the govern- 
ment, to prevent the possibility of their falling into dependence on private char- 
ity or public poor relief. 
U.S.  federalism, and  its  early  electoral  democratization, encouraged the 
competitive  expansion  of  locally  managed public  education throughout the 
nineteenth century, while also allowing space for varieties of private schooling 
to flourish. Popular groups in America gained voting rights early, and farmers 
and workers alike saw education as a way to participate fully in a democratic 
polity and market society. No aristocracy, established church, or national bu- 
reaucracy held sway; thus schools and colleges and universities were free to 
proliferate  competitively  across localities  and states. Early American  public 
education was oriented more toward socializing majorities for citizenship than 
toward preparing elites for civil service careers (Katznelson and Weir 1985). 
During the Civil War, moreover, the ascendant Republicans enacted land grant 
subsidies  to encourage public  higher  education and agricultural  research  to 
benefit farmers across many states. 
In other ways, as well, the nineteenth-century U.S. polity encouraged inclu- 
sive social policies. After the Civil War, the expansion of benefits for Union 
veterans became rooted in competition between patronage-oriented  political 
parties,  as politicians  used  distributive  policies  to assemble  cross-class  and 
cross-regional electoral support from a highly mobilized and competitive male 
electorate (McCormick 1979). Union veterans and their dependents were seen 
as deserving of national support, but more than that, the old soldiers and those 
tied to them constituted critical blocs of voters, especially the tightly elector- 
ally competitive East and Midwest after the end of Reconstruction.  Between 
the mid- 1870s and the mid- 1890s, the Republican Party in particular learned 
to combine tariffs and pension expenditures. Tariffs raised plentiful revenues 
for the federal government. In turn, the revenues could be spent on pensions, 316  Theda Skocpol 
applications for which could be manipulated in ways that helped the Republi- 
cans to appeal to electorally competitive states just before crucial elections 
(McMuny 1922). Along with party politicians, thousands of  veterans’ clubs 
federated into the Grand Army of the Republic became key supporters of pen- 
sion  generosity  from  the  mid- 1880s onward, keeping  congressmen  across 
many northern legislative districts keenly  interested  in such social expendi- 
tures from the federal fisc. 
11.2.2  The Maternalist Era 
During the early 1900s, various policies aiming to help women workers and 
mothers and children proliferated (see Skocpol 1992, part 3). The federal gov- 
ernment established the female-run Children’s Bureau in 1912, and expanded 
its mission in  1921 through the enactment of the Sheppard-Towner program 
partially to fund state and local health care education to help American mothers 
and  babies.  Meanwhile, dozens of  states  enacted protective  labor  laws for 
women workers, arguing that their capacity for motherhood had to be pro- 
tected. And forty-four states also enabled local jurisdictions to provide “moth- 
ers’ pensions” to impoverished caretakers of fatherless children. 
Around  1900, the nineteenth-century U.S. “state of courts and parties” was 
undergoing major structural transformations. The Democrats and Republicans 
became less electorally competitive in most parts of the nation, and elite and 
middle-class  groups  were  calling for political reforms  that  would  weaken 
patronage-oriented parties  and  create nonpartisan, professional  agencies of 
government. At this juncture, reformers who wanted the United States to imi- 
tate early European social insurance and pension programs made little head- 
way. Informed publics did not believe that turn-of-the-century American gov- 
ernments  could  administer  policies  honestly  or  efficiently, and  reformers 
feared  “corruption”  among  politicians  if  huge  new  social  spending  pro- 
grams-reminiscent  to them of Civil War pensions-were  created. 
Yet the same set of political circumstances that discouraged social spending 
for workingmen in the United States opened up opportunities for what I call 
“maternalist” reformers advocating social programs for mothers and children. 
Until 1920 (or a few years before in some states), American women lacked the 
right to vote, yet they were hardly absent from politics more broadly under- 
stood (Baker 1984). Elite and middle-class women formed voluntary organiza- 
tions to engage in charitable, cultural, and civic activities. By the turn of the 
century, nation-spanning federations of  women’s  voluntary  associations  had 
formed, exactly paralleling the three-tier structure of U.S. local-state-federal 
government. Women’s federations allied themselves with higher-educated fe- 
male professional reformers,  arguing that the moral and domestic values of 
married homemakers and mothers should be projected into public affairs. Or- 
ganized women urged legislators regardless of party to enact new social poli- 
cies to help families, communities, and-above  all-mothers  and children. 
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officials  and trade unions could  not readily  take the lead in enacting  social 
policies for workingmen, U.S. women’s voluntary federations  were uniquely 
well positioned to shape public debates across many local legislative districts 
(Skocpol 1992, page 3; Skocpol et al. 1993).  Thus the United States tended to 
enact maternalist regulations, services, and benefits at a time when European 
nations were establishing  fledgling  social insurance programs  for industrial 
workers and their dependents. 
Women’s voluntary associations were more successful at setting agendas of 
civic debate and getting legislators to enact regulations or “enabling statutes” 
than they were at persuading governments to generously fund social programs. 
Mothers’ pensions, in particular, were never adequately funded, and soon de- 
generated  into  new  versions  of  poor  relief.  Ironically,  too,  after American 
women were admitted to the formal electorate by the Nineteenth Amendment 
in  1920, the civic engagement  of many women’s groups weakened. For this 
and a variety of other reasons-including  the mobilization of the American 
Medical Association in opposition to Sheppard-Towner maternal health clin- 
ics-the  expansion of maternalist social policies came to a halt by the later 
1920s, and indeed was partially  reversed. Then came the Great Depression, 
bringing with it social and political upheavals that ushered in the next great era 
of U.S. social policy innovation. 
11.2.3  The New Deal Era 
This watershed period featured various federal programs to help the (tempo- 
rarily) unemployed, with the Social Security Act of 1935, which included na- 
tional Old Age Insurance (OAI), federally required and state-run unemploy- 
ment insurance, and federal subsidies for optional, state-controlled  Old Age 
Assistance and Aid to Dependent Children (ADC, which was a continuation 
of  the earlier mothers’  pensions).  In the public  discourse  of the  1930s and 
1940s, the most “deserving” recipients of social benefits were said to be nor- 
mally employed men who were temporarily forced out of work by the Depres- 
sion, and the elderly. By the early 1950s, it was clear that social insurance for 
retired elderly wage earners and their dependents had emerged as the center- 
piece  of  such generous  and comprehensive public  social provision  as there 
would be in post-World War I1 America (Amenta and Skocpol 1988).  The only 
other truly generous and comprehensive part of postwar national social provi- 
sion was the GI Bill of 1944, which featured employment assistance and edu- 
cational and housing loans for military veterans. 
A number of structural changes and political developments set the stage for 
the policy innovations of the 1930s and 1940s. The federal government-and 
within it the Executive-came  to the fore in the emergency of massive eco- 
nomic depression. State and local governments and charity groups exhausted 
their resources and literally begged for federal interventions, even as business 
groups and other conservatives lost their ability to veto governmental initia- 
tives. Economic crisis also spurred the unionization of  industrial workers as 318  Theda Skocpol 
well as protests by  organizations of farmers, the unemployed, and-perhaps 
most important-old  people. Among the elderly, there emerged a widespread 
federation of local Townsend clubs demanding generous pensions for the el- 
derly. Economic crisis also spurred electoral realignment, shifting votes from 
Republicans to Democrats-and  transforming the Democrats from a warring 
camp of  southern  “dry” Protestants versus  northern  “wet” Catholics,  into a 
nationwide conglomerate of local and state political machines all hungry for 
new flows of economic resources. 
What the Depression, the New Deal, and even World War I1 did not  do, 
however, was to remove contradictory local and state interests from “national” 
US.  policy making. Even at their strongest, President Franklin Roosevelt and 
the  assorted  New  Deal  reformist  professionals  who flocked  into  executive 
agencies during the  1930s, all had to compromise with congressional coali- 
tions rooted in state and local interests (Patterson 1967).  Above all, they had 
to respect Southern Democrats’ determination to protect their region’s  share- 
cropping agriculture and low-wage industries from actually (or potentially) un- 
settling “intrusions” by  northern  unions  or federal bureaucrats.  Southerners 
were happy to have resources from the federal government, but did not want 
either centralized controls or benefits that might undermine existing southern 
labor and race relations. And if the truth be told, congressional representatives 
of other localities and states in the nation felt pretty much the same protective 
way  about whatever the major labor and social relations of their areas might 
be. There was a broad congressional consensus throughout the New Deal and 
the  1940s to preserve a great deal of federal variety in economic and social 
policy (Skocpol and Amenta 1985). 
From this perspective, the shape and limits of the major social and economic 
programs of the New Deal era are not surprising. Federally run employment 
programs did not survive the mass unemployment of the 1930s,  because efforts 
to  institutionalize  Executive-run  “full  employment  planning”  and  “social 
Keynesianism” ran  afoul of  congressionally  represented  southern, business, 
and farm interests (Weir and Skocpol 1985).  The Social Security Act included 
only one truly national program-OAI-enacted  in an area where no states 
had previously established programs. Unemployment insurance, meanwhile, 
was made federal rather than national, not only because representatives of the 
South wanted their states to be able to establish terms of coverage, benefits, 
and taxation, but  also because  representatives of Wisconsin and New York 
wanted their “liberal” states to be able to preserve the terms of the unemploy- 
ment insurance programs they had already established, prior to the Social Se- 
curity Act (Amenta et al. 1987).  Public assistance programs for the elderly and 
for dependent children were given federal subsidies under Social Security, but 
otherwise left entirely in the hands of the states. 
During World War 11,  New Deal reformers tied to the National Resources 
Planning Board talked about permanently  nationalizing and expanding both 
public assistance  and unemployment  insurance. But their proposals  got no- 319  The Politics of American Social Policy, Past and Future 
where at all, and Congress disbanded the National Resources Planning Board 
soon after they were made. Only OAI tended to expand coverage and become 
more comprehensive after 1935. Widows and orphans of wage-earning “con- 
tributors” were added to OAI in 1939, transforming it into Old Age and Survi- 
vors Insurance.  During  the  1950s, benefits  for disabled  wage  earners were 
added to what was now known  simply as Social Security, and coverage was 
extended  to more occupations.  The American  “welfare  state”  that emerged 
form the New Deal and World War I1 was hardly comprehensive by the interna- 
tional standards of the day, yet it did eventually become relatively  complete 
and generous for retired, disabled, or deceased regular wage earners and their 
dependents. The GI Bill and other World War I1 veterans’ programs served as 
a kind of social support program for many young families in the 1950s. But of 
course, this was a temporary set of supports that “grew up” with the age co- 
horts that fought World War 11,  and has not been in place for the younger co- 
horts that have followed (Newman 1993). 
11.2.4  The Era of Controversies over the Federal Social Role 
A new period of innovation in U.S. social policy was launched in the after- 
math of the civil rights struggles of the  1950s and  1960s, as southern blacks 
gained the right to vote and liberal Democrats very temporarily gained execu- 
tive power and majorities in Congress (Patterson 1981, parts 3 and 4). Liberals 
dreamed of “completing” the social and economic agendas left over from the 
unfinished reform agendas of the 1930s and 1940s, and many activists hoped 
to rework U.S. social programs in ways that would  aid and uplift  the poor, 
particularly the newly aroused black poor. 
Despite the extravagance of liberal hopes (not to mention radical demands) 
at the height of the War on Poverty and the Great Society, policy legacies and 
institutional features inherited from the New Deal era shaped and limited the 
openings available to policy makers. As Margaret Weir (1  992) has explained, 
liberals, unionists, and civil rights activists were not in a good position to cre- 
ate  public  full-employment  programs  that  might  have jointly benefited  the 
black poor along with white and black unionized workers. Instead, institutional 
and intellectual legacies from the New Deal and the 1940s encouraged public 
policies that emphasized “commercial Keynesian” macroeconomic  strategies 
supplemented  by  small federal programs  designed  to reeducate  the poor  to 
make them “employable.” Soon caught in political controversies and squeezed 
for  resources  during  the  Vietnam  War,  federally  sponsored  employment- 
training efforts never really succeeded. 
As the War on Poverty gave way to the Great Society and Nixon reforms, 
the emphasis shifted from job training and community development programs, 
toward helping the poor through new or expanded categorical social benefits 
such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), food stamps, and 
Medicaid. Reasons for this shift are many, but they include liberal demands for 
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ence of the Nixon administration for spending rather than subsidies for ser- 
vices and antipoverty agencies that were likely to be part of the Democratic 
Party’s organizational base. For a time, expanded social spending on targeted 
welfare programs helped welfare mothers and their children, as more needy 
single-parent families than ever before were added to the welfare rolls. Yet 
during this same period, the Social Security Administration took advantage of 
the heightened concern with antipoverty policy to put through long-laid plans 
for Medicare, nationalized Supplemental Security Income, and indexed Social 
Security benefits. In due course, the elderly on Medicare, Supplemental Secu- 
rity Income, and Social Security after it was indexed in 1972 benefited most 
from the social policy innovations of the so-called War on Poverty era. Despite 
the focus of the rhetoric of this period on poor working-age people and chil- 
dren, the most generous and sustainable innovations of the period helped to 
pull most of the American elderly out of dire poverty for the first time in mod- 
ern history (Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1986, 61). 
Nor was this the end of  the story of how the War  on Poverty and Great 
Society ended up shortchanging the poor. By the later 1970s, and particularly 
during the 1980s, political backlashes set in against the social policy innova- 
tions and extensions of the 1960s and early  1970s. Leaving aside important 
exceptions and nuances, one cay say that expanded “social security” provision 
for the elderly (poor and nonpoor alike) remained popular with broad, biparti- 
san swatches of American voters and politicians, while public “welfare” assis- 
tance to the working-age poor became an increasingly contentious issue among 
politicians and intellectuals, and within the electorate as a whole. The division 
between “social security” as a set of  earned benefits and “welfare” as unde- 
served handouts to the poor had been built into the programmatic structure of 
federal social provision since the New Deal; in the wake of the policy changes 
of the 1960s and 1970s, this division became highly politicized  along racial 
lines. AFDC, food stamps, Medicaid, and other targeted “welfare” programs 
expanded after the mid- 1960s. But, argued conservative critics, America’s so- 
cial problems got worse, not better. Although few experts familiar with statisti- 
cal arguments about poverty accept the accuracy of claims by analysts such as 
Charles  Murray  (1984)  that  federal  antipoverty  programs  have  actually 
“caused” increased in out-of-wedlock childbearing or crime, it is fair to say 
that this argument has expressed (and helped to create) a sea change in popular 
and expert opinion over the past couple of  decades. After all, expansions of 
welfare  in the  1960s and  1970s manifestly  did not reverse or prevent such 
poverty-related  social ills as  increasing out-of-wedlock childbearing. Thus, 
even if the causal picture is not what Murray argues, the picture he paints can 
easily have a broader ideological resonance with general expert and citizen 
frustration about “welfare as we know it.” 
Attacks  on expansions of  federally mandated or subsidized  welfare  pro- 
grams for the poor aided the electoral fortunes of Republicans and-more  gen- 
erally-of  conservative critics of governmental social provision  (Edsall and 
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successful. Some would argue that they appealed to tacit racism in the U.S. 
white  majority  (Quadagno  1994);  others  would  argue  that,  racism  aside, 
middle-class and working-class citizens were less and less willing to pay taxes 
for federal social transfers during a time of employment instability and declin- 
ing real family wages. Whatever the reasons, conservative Republican Ronald 
Reagan used antiwelfare appeals as part of his winning campaign for the presi- 
dency in  1980. And  after Reagan  ascended to office, the rate of growth of 
federal social spending slowed. More pertinent, a sweeping tax cut was en- 
acted in 1981, setting the stage for growing federal deficit that has since made 
it virtually impossible for new social programs to be funded. The persistence 
of a huge federal deficit also encouraged renewed conservative calls for severe 
cutbacks in federal social programs, including Social Security and Medicare 
(as well as “welfare,” which after all accounts for only a tiny portion of the 
federal budget). 
The Reagan administration of the  1980s did not eliminate many programs 
or cut absolute domestic social spending, but it did retard the growth of expen- 
ditures on targeted programs that had already lost considerable ground in the 
face of inflation during the 1970s. More important, the Reagan era signaled an 
ideological sea change. Both politicians’ rhetoric and the actual squeezing and 
disrupting of governmental programs that occurred in this period helped to 
delegitimate governmental solutions to domestic social ills. Politicians became 
highly reluctant  to discuss taxation as a positive means to the resolution of 
civic or individual concerns (Blumenthal and Edsall 1988). And the huge fed- 
eral budget  deficit created by  Ronald  Reagan’s  tax cuts itself moved to the 
center of public discussion as supposedly the leading problem for the nation 
to resolve in the 1990s-neatly  directing attention away from the increasingly 
acute difficulties faced, not only by  welfare recipients, but by  less-educated 
working  families in the U.S.  national economy  (Danzinger and Gottschalk 
1993; Freeman 1994). 
Many of the supporters of Bill Clinton hoped that the election of this moder- 
ate Democratic president in  1992 would suddenly undo the delegitimation of 
the federal social role that had progressed so far since the 1970s. It is by now 
apparent, however, that the policy initiatives of the Clinton administration of- 
ten cannot assemble congressional majorities, and are invariably debated in a 
context of the continuing federal budget crisis and intense popular distrust of 
government. The decade of the 1990s is proving to be as ideologically conten- 
tious as any period in modern U.S. political history-especially  on matters 
having to do with the extent and forms of federal government involvement in 
the regulation or funding of social benefits and services. 
11.3  Opportunities and Constraints in U.S. Social Policy Making 
Patterns in history are not just of antiquarian interest. They speak to issues 
that continue to animate U.S. political  debates today. Although  no one can 
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discern a number of interesting patterns across past eras of U.S. social policy 
and politics-patterns  that at least cast light on alternative strategies, and on 
constraints and possibilities that matter for all of us as we debate policies for 
the American future, including debates about the particular kinds of policies 
featured in this volume. 
11.3.1  The Popularity of Social Programs for the “Worthy” Many 
It is often claimed that Americans are a people inherently opposed to taking 
“handouts” from government. But a full historical purview suggests that much 
depends on how benefits are understood and structured. Since the nineteenth 
century, large numbers of mainstream American citizens have been delighted 
to accept-and  politically  support-certain  generous, government-funded so- 
cial benefits. Public education, Civil War benefits, the Sheppard-Towner health 
program aimed at American mothers and babies, and Social Security insur- 
ance-all  are examples of broad social programs that have done very well in 
U.S. democracy.  Such programs have been aimed at beneficiaries  culturally 
defined (at any given time) as “worthy” because of their past or potential con- 
tributions to the nation. Children have been understood  as potential  citizens 
and economic contributors,  and military  veterans  as those  who  served and 
“saved” the nation. By the 1930s, the elderly were seen as worthy of support 
after a lifetime of  “contributions,”  through both  taxes and  work. And  back 
around  1900, interestingly enough, mothers were celebrated as “serving the 
community” through childbearing and rearing in the home. 
By now, of course, things have changed for mothers. Since the  1960s, the 
labor-force participation of married American  women,  including mothers of 
young children, has grown sharply. Elite and middle-class Americans no longer 
celebrate the cultural ideal of the “stay-at-home mother,” and this erosion of 
the original cultural understanding behind mothers’ pensions/ADC/AFDC  co- 
incides with the racial tensions over poverty programs that I discussed above. 
More than ever before in U.S. history, welfare mothers have come to be defined 
as “not working,” as taking “handouts.” Not only are mothers on public assis- 
tance more likely to be unwed or divorced and disproportionately  nonwhite, 
rather than the mostly white widows they once were; their work as child rearers 
in the home is no longer consensually valued in American culture. Indeed, the 
capacities of poor mothers to do an adequate job of raising their own children 
are nowadays very often questioned by professional experts and the middle- 
class public. Back in the 1910s, reformers argued that mother love in the home 
was the key to good child rearing, and that poor fatherless children should be 
taken out of the orphanages or foster homes to which they had been consigned. 
Today, reformers are just as likely to argue that poor children would be better 
off in day care centers, or maybe even in orphanages. 
The structure of  benefit  programs  as more  or less universal  matters,  too 
(along with cultural understandings about which categories of people are wor- 
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typically  reluctant  to see public  monies  spent for the poor through  welfare 
programs, they have repeatedly been willing  to support politically  and pay 
taxes for social benefits that are considered to be “earned” by citizens such as 
themselves. Aid to the poor has also been acceptable whenever such aid has 
been part of broader, more universalistic policies that also benefit middle-class 
citizens (Skocpol  1991). As Hugh Heclo (1986) has explained,  perhaps the 
best way to help the poor in America is to do so without talking about them, in 
the context of social services or benefits that have a broader, more universal 
constituency. 
Social Security benefits for the retired  elderly  are the best contemporary 
example of support by Americans  for universal social policy. Because of the 
way the financing for Social Security was set up (a matter discussed below), 
and because of how the program was portrayed by its administrators after 1935 
(Derthick 1979), retired wage earners are thought to “earn” pensions linked to 
their records of employment and the previous levels of their wages. Actually 
the system is financed from current taxes, and there is considerable redistribu- 
tion toward lower-income retirees, but these features of the system have never 
been made politically visible to the average participant.  Social Security now 
encompasses almost all employed Americans and their families, and since the 
1970s it has become by  far the nation’s most effective antipoverty program, 
without being defined as such. In recent decades, Social Security has enjoyed 
strong bipartisan support across lines of class and race. 
Conservatives who are opposed to large governmental programs of social 
provision understand well that Social Security is hard to cut back as long as 
it has middle-class  support.  It is therefore  not incidental  that contemporary 
conservative tactics for shrinking Social Security take the form of  efforts, first, 
to convince young upper-middle-class employees that Social Security is a “bad 
deal” for them economically, that they would be better off to turn to private 
investments for retirement. Another tactic is to attempt to undermine the con- 
fidence of all Americans that Social Security will be there in the future, by 
suggesting that the system is “bound to go bankrupt” as the post-World War TI 
baby boom generation ages. Actually, Social Security is currently in fine fiscal 
shape, and any problems for the long-term future could readily be addressed 
by the kinds of bipartisan commissions that have made adjustments in the past. 
Using lurid projections that presume no such adjustments will ever be made, 
conservatives  propose to “save”  Social Security by trimming it back into a 
program targeted especially on the most needy elderly, and taking better-off 
middle-class people out of  the system. 
Some critics of Social Security may honestly believe this is just a matter of 
fiscal responsibility, but many surely have learned a lesson from political his- 
tory: Social Security has expanded and survived because it has middle-class 
participation and support. If middle-class Americans are removed from the sys- 
tem, they would soon resist paying taxes that are currently used to create pro- 
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rity would soon be gutted, turned into one more demeaning welfare program 
for the poor. Then it could easily be cut back even further, transferring re- 
sources to private investments controlled by the well-to-do while leaving mil- 
lions of  elderly Americans mired in poverty, as they were before the  1970s. 
Their children and grandchildren (especially the women among them) would 
also suffer, because any taxes they saved during their working lifetimes would 
be more than offset by the expense and disruption of caring for parents without 
adequate resources to live with dignity in retirement. Historical analysis sug- 
gests that this  sort of  scenario will very  likely  unfold  if  Social Security is 
changed from a relatively universal social benefit for the deserving majority, 
into a means-tested welfare benefit narrowly targeted on the most needy few. 
11.3.2  The Problem of “Government Bureaucracy” 
History also shows that arguments over particular social policies at given 
moments of U.S. history have been closely linked to perspectives on what U.S. 
government should do, and to beliefs about what it apparently can do effec- 
tively. Americans are recurrently skeptical that government can administer pro- 
grams effectively. What is more, policy debates are influenced by the reactions 
of governmental officials, citizens, and politically active social groups to previ- 
ous public policies. Prior policies may be seen as models to be extended or 
imitated, or they may be seen as “bad” examples to be avoided in the future. If 
policies that serve as an immediate referent for debates are seen as wasteful or 
corruptly or inefficiently administered,  those perceptions can undermine ef- 
forts to create new or expanded policies along the same lines. 
Back in the early twentieth century, for example, some politicians and trade 
unionists wanted to imitate Civil War pensions, extending them into pensions 
for most elderly working Americans. But most politically active middle-class 
groups in that era viewed Civil War pensions as a negative precedent. They 
were trying to reduce the power of the kinds of elected legislators and party 
politicians who had worked to expand Civil War pensions in the first place. 
And they saw Civil War pensions not as social expenditures that legitimately 
aided many deserving elderly or disabled people, but as sources of funding for 
“political corruption” (Skocpol 1992, part 2). 
In the 1990s, some politicians and groups want to build upon existing parts 
of U.S. social policy-for  example, moving from Social Security for the el- 
derly to universal “health security” for all Americans.  During the Medicare 
battles of the 1960s, reformers were successful in invoking the Social Security 
model to mobilize support for medical insurance for all of the elderly, rather 
than for benefits targeted on the poor elderly alone (Jacobs 1993, chap. 9). 
Today, however, the Social Security precedent may have less influence. Many 
people  believe  that  the  U.S.  government bungles  virtually  any program  it 
touches, They point to problems with the postal service, or with earlier federal 
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will inevitably be undermined if the national government takes a stronger role 
in the health care system. 
A historical and institutional perspective on the 1993-94  debate over health 
care reform helps us to understand why the comprehensive health security plan 
introduced by  President Clinton in September 1993, apparently  to great ac- 
claim, so quickly became the target of rhetorically devastating attacks against 
“governmental bureaucracy.” To  be sure, President Clinton and his advisers 
tried  to use lessons  from U.S. political  history  in devising and arguing for 
their version of comprehensive health care reform. I have already noted the 
president’s attempt to link up with favorable attitudes toward Social Security 
by emphasizing universal health coverage that “can never be taken away” from 
any American. In addition, the president and his advisers tried to be clever (to 
the point of obfuscation) about the issue of governmental power. They took it 
for granted that Americans are wary of giving “the state” a stronger role than 
“competitive market forces.” Consequently, they proposed a version of health 
refom-called  managed competition-that  supposedly did not rely on taxes, 
and that allegedly would preserve and enhance market competition in the offer- 
ing of health insurance “choices” to all Americans (Stan 1994; Hacker 1994). 
Still, the president and the health care experts who advised him may have 
failed  to  notice  a  quite  important-historically  noticeable-nuance  about 
American reactions to governmental power. Especially since the 1980s, con- 
servatives have proclaimed that Americans invariably hate taxes. But history 
shows that middle-class Americans have been quite willing to pay taxes when 
they were sure that these monies would go for worthy purposes from which 
they along with other citizens benefit. At the same time, history also reveals 
that many sorts of proposed social policy reforms-including  proposals for 
publicly guaranteed health coverage in the 1910s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1970s- 
have been highly vulnerable to ideological counterattacks against government 
“bureaucracy” (Skocpol 1993). Arguably, Americans resent government regu- 
lations even more than they may dislike taxes. 
Of course, the Clinton health care reform plan of 1993 was very susceptible 
to the “bureaucracy” criticism. It tried to achieve universal coverage and cost 
control in health care by overlaying multiple existing private bureaucracies- 
hospitals, insurance companies, medical associations, state and local govern- 
ments-with  still more layers of federal bureaucratic regulation. Conservative 
critics were able to ridicule the proposed Clinton reforms for their regulatory 
complexity. 
Although U.S.  government has always been in many ways much less bureau- 
cratic than the governments of other advanced-industrial nations, nevertheless 
there are understandable reasons why Americans fear public regulations. Pre- 
cisely because the federal government in the United States lacks strong admin- 
istrative bureaucracies that can reach directly into localities or the economy, 
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financial incentives and legal rules to get things done. The federal government 
partly bribes and partly bosses around state and local governments and nongov- 
ernmental groups-getting  them to help the federal government do what it 
cannot do alone. Ironically, however, this sort of situation often gives rise to 
louder outcries against “federal bureaucratic meddling” than might exist if the 
national government were able to act directly, especially by using administra- 
tively unobtrusive financial transfers to cover a modicum of health insurance 
for everyone. Such outcries are especially likely to occur if the federal govern- 
ment proposes to regulate more than to subsidize. 
Thus, in the debates over the Clinton health plan, lots of groups-including 
insurance companies, but also hospitals and state governments-feared  that 
federal regulations might financially squeeze and forcibly remodel their opera- 
tions over time, without giving them offsetting benefits in the form of generous 
federal subsidies to pay for currently uninsured groups of citizens. This worry 
about the “bureaucracy”  of  the Clinton  health  care plan  was obviously  en- 
hanced by the fact that the president’s declared objectives include “controlling 
costs” in the national health care system, as well as extending coverage to all 
Americans. The president promised to do all of this without raising new gen- 
eral tax revenues, and opinion polls indicated that people were (rightly) skepti- 
cal about “getting something for nothing.” Ironically, by trying to quell worries 
about  taxation,  the  president  and  his  allies  heightened  even  more  deep- 
seated-and  historically  very  predictable-worries  about “government  bu- 
reaucracy” in the United States. 
11.3.3  Will Americans Pay Taxes for Social Programs? 
U.S. history gives the lie to a notion accepted as virtually sacrosanct in the 
early 1990s:  Americans will not pay taxes to fund social programs. At the same 
time, history highlights how crucial the issue of taxes is. If programs are not 
linked to reliable sources of funds, they cannot readily expand into the sorts of 
generous, cross-class programs that gain broad popular support in American 
democracy. 
Civil War benefits in the late nineteenth  century had the luxury of being 
linked to a politically complementary and very generous source of federal tax- 
ation.  Republicans in that era were not  only  the party  that had  “saved  the 
Union” and wanted to do well by the veterans and their relatives. Republicans 
were also supporters of high tariffs on U.S. industrial and some agricultural 
commodities. Those tariffs rewarded carefully fashioned alliances of business- 
men, workers, and some farmers in the North, while in effect punishing south- 
ern farmers, who did not vote for the Republicans (Bensel 1984, chap. 3). At 
the same time, tariffs generated a lot of funds for the federal treasury. Actual 
“surpluses” emerged at key junctures, and the Republicans needed politically 
popular ways to spend them. One of the answers, from the Republican point 
of view, was Civil War benefits, because these tended to go to people in their 
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trial towns-who  were likely to have served (or had family members or neigh- 
bors serve) in the Union armies, but who did not necessarily benefit from tariff 
regulations (Sanders 1980). For a time, the Republicans ended up in the best 
of all possible policy worlds; they could support and expand politically com- 
plementary taxation, regulatory, and spending programs. 
Matemalist social policies ended up being very limited in the public funding 
they could mobilize, and thus the benefits they could deliver to broad constitu- 
encies. As I pointed out earlier, the federated  women’s  associations  that had 
considerable success at influencing public opinion and the enactment of regu- 
latory  legislation  in the  states, often could not  persuade  legislators to  raise 
taxes and generously fund programs for mothers and children. This was an era 
of attacks on taxes by advocates of business competitiveness, and those attacks 
were especially likely to be effective in local and state governments, where 
funding decisions were made about mothers’ pensions. At the federal level, 
tariffs were raising proportionately less revenue, and the income tax, instituted 
in 1913, remained marginal and focused only on the wealthy. 
The only maternalist program that managed to tap into expanded funding 
for a time was the Sheppard-Towner program of the early 1920s. This was the 
one maternalist  program  structured as federal subsidies for a set of services 
open not just to the poor but to all American mothers; consequently, women’s 
groups were able to ally with the Children’s Bureau to persuade Congress to 
increase the program’s appropriations over its first years. But by the mid-l920s, 
Sheppard-Towner had come under fierce attack from conservatives, including 
doctors, opposed to federally supervised and financed  social services.  The 
original legislation, enacted in  1921, expired in  1926 and had to be reautho- 
rized by Congress. While majority support still existed, opponents in the Sen- 
ate were able to use the institutional levers available to determined minorities 
in U.S. governance to block reauthorization after 1928. Sheppard-Towner sub- 
sidies disappeared, and the Children’s Bureau  lost influence  along with  re- 
sources within the federal government. 
It is well known, of course, that U.S. federal government revenues expanded 
after the Depression and World War 11. During the 1930s, all levels of govern- 
ment were strapped for resources in a devastated economy, but the federal gov- 
ernment gained relative leverage over local and state governments because of 
its continuing ability to borrow. Although the Roosevelt administration tried to 
cut taxes and reduce government spending, it also raised and deployed “emer- 
gency funding”  to cover many economic and social programs.  Then during 
World War 11, the federal income tax was expanded to encompass much of the 
employed population. Automatic payroll withholding was instituted, a device 
that makes tax payments less visible to citizens, thus ensuring a regular and 
expanding flow of revenues to the federal government during the postwar eco- 
nomic expansion. 
The various programs enacted in the Social Security  Act of 1935 surely ben- 
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1940s. Yet OAI, the part of the 1935 legislation that eventually became popular 
and virtually universal-and  usurped the label “Social Security”-carried  its 
own source of funding: an earmarked payroll tax that was supposed to be used 
to build up a separate “trust fund” to cover future pension obligation. Because 
of President Roosevelt’s fierce insistence on “fiscal soundness” for nonemer- 
gency social insurance programs, retirement insurance actually kicked in as a 
set of taxes well before any benefits were paid. After 1939, the program became 
more of a pay-as-you-go venture than it was originally (Achenbaum 1986; Ber- 
kowitz  1987). Still, Social Security retirement  insurance always benefited- 
ideologically as well as fiscally-from  the existence of its earmarked payroll 
tax and nominally separate trust fund. Social Security taxes were deliberately 
labeled “contributions”  and were treated as payments that built up individual 
“eligibility” for “earned benefits” (Derthick 1979; Zollars and Skocpol 1994). 
As the system expanded to include more and more categories of employees, 
new taxes were collected ahead of the payment of benefits. Most retirees dur- 
ing the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s actually did very well in terms of what they 
had paid into the system over their working lives. Increasing Social Security 
payroll taxes were accepted politically by most American citizens as the system 
expanded toward  near-universal  coverage.  Once the  coverage became  very 
broad, the majority of citizens-the  elderly and their children-gained  a stake 
in promised  benefits. Even today, Americans  do not object as much  as one 
might expect to Social Security taxes, despite their regressiveness and the large 
cut they take from average incomes. The Social Security system’s trust fund 
remains relatively solvent within an otherwise severely strained federal budget, 
and this affords it a bit of political protection in the face of determined conser- 
vative efforts to cut social spending. 
Taxes are arguably the pivot on which the future of federal social policy may 
turn. The Concord Coalition, Ross Perot, and other advocates of deficit cutting 
are determined to severely cut both federal taxes and federal social spending. 
The aim is to shift U.S. savings into private investment funds. Deficit cutters 
appeal to American  middle-class  citizens as taxpayers-especially  as payers 
of property and income taxes-rather  than as potential beneficiaries of existing 
or new broadly focused social programs. As I have already discussed, deficit- 
cutting conservatives are hard at work trying to reduce American middle-class 
faith in the viability and legitimacy of “middle-class entitlements” such as So- 
cial Security and Medicare. And of  course, deficit cutters are determined  to 
block broad  new federal commitments to universal health care or long-term 
care benefits for the elderly. 
On the other side of the political  spectrum, progressives want to increase 
government-funded “investments” not only in the economy, but also in educa- 
tion, health care, and other social services. Progressives have already lost many 
battles  to expand such social programs to the degree that they are narrowly 
targeted on the poor, on blacks, or on inner cities. They are still trying to ex- 
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that “children’s programs” are a proxy for “welfare” expenditures or for make- 
work  social service jobs (Taylor  1991). One way out is to advocate,  as the 
Clinton  administration  has  done, either “tax credits”  for the less privileged 
(such as the Earned Income Tax Credit) or extensions of universal “security” 
programs (such as health care coverage) that are claimed to benefit the middle 
class as much or more than the poor. But such progressive strategies are badly 
hampered by the unwillingness  of Democratic Party politicians to think cre- 
atively about-or  talk publicly about-taxes.  After all, tax-expenditure  pro- 
grams can hardly be expanded indefinitely as a tool of federal social policy, 
in an era of  huge  deficits and reduced overall  tax  revenues. And  new  uni- 
versal social programs cannot work politically, as we have seen in the recent 
health care debate, unless they have some federally  mobilized  resources be- 
hind them. 
11.3.4  Better Social Policies for the Future? 
A historical-institution,  polity-centered approach to understanding the poli- 
tics of U.S. social policy making encourages us to consider macroscopic con- 
texts, period effects, and interconnections  among specialized “policy areas.” 
Even  so, implications  can be drawn out for the particular  policy  issues ad- 
dressed in this book. I have already discussed the implications of my approach 
for understanding  the  1993-94  debates about President  Bill Clinton’s health 
security bill. Those debates sputtered to inconclusion in the fall of  1994, and 
comprehensive  health financing reform  is unlikely to come again soon onto 
the  U.S. legislative agenda. I  expect the next rounds of  debate to focus on 
extending coverage for people leaving welfare, on extending insurance cover- 
age to all or most American  children, and-perhaps  above all-on  cutting 
Medicare as a way to relieve pressures on the federal budget. The constraints 
that will operate in these debates are well captured by the general discussions 
I have already offered. Consequently, I propose to say little more here about 
health care reform; I shall focus instead on long-term care for the elderly, edu- 
cational reform, and issues about child care provision. 
New policy ideas in each of these areas cannot be considered on economic- 
efficiency grounds alone. Any new proposals would necessarily  be debated, 
enacted, and implemented within the context of  the sorts of overall limits and 
possibilities I have already discussed, and against the backdrop of previously 
existing social policies about children and the elderly. The focus of this vol- 
ume, moreover, is largely on social services, not simply monetary benefits fi- 
nanced privately or through government. That means that the politics of each 
of these areas activates actual or would-be  service deliverers, as well as the 
social groups that do, or might, benefit from the services in question. Day care 
providers,  teachers,  school  administrators,  nursing-home  operators, doctors, 
and insurance companies-all  of these sorts of “providers” matter as much as, 
and usually more than, children and old people in the politics of designing and 
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Long-Term Care 
Possibilities for financing long-term care for the elderly are very much tied 
up by current national concerns about the federal budget deficit and the grow- 
ing cost of commitments that have already been made to elderly health care 
through  Medicare and Medicaid. (Although neither Medicare  nor Medicaid 
offers sufficient coverage for long-term care, and certainly not for home-based 
care, Medicaid does cover nursing home expenses for the impoverished elderly 
and for middle-class retirees who “spend down” to the near-poverty  level in 
order to attain eligibility.) Because of current citizen hostility toward govern- 
ment  and public  spending, proposed  new  cuts in  federal  expenditures for 
Medicare and Medicaid are likely to dominate debates about “health care re- 
form” for the next few years. If recent trends toward squeezing physician and 
hospital reimbursements continue, we may expect that Medicare and Medicaid 
will function less and less effectively over time, spreading popular disillusion- 
ment with public health insurance, without addressing the actual social needs 
privately, either. Crises of coverage, cost shifting, and efficiency in America’s 
current hybrid health financing “system” may simply deepen for a decade or 
so, as the aftermath of the failed debates of 1994 plays out politically. 
As we have learned elsewhere in this volume, private insurance is unlikely 
to offer viable policies to help today’s young and middle-aged adults plan for 
possible long-term care expenditures  when they become very old. Yet enact- 
ment of a new comprehensive, non-means-tested federal guarantee in this area 
seems equally unlikely. An economically  rational solution might be a federal 
requirement  that each American  “save” from private income for future long- 
term care, either in the home or in institutional settings. This sort of proposal 
would rely on federal regulatory power, but not spending, and it might attract 
support from nursing home operators and health care providers. However, any 
such mandatory requirement would be very much subject to political criticism 
as a form of  “governmental coercion”-and  as an additional  tax burden on 
already hard-pressed working-age families. I conclude that such a mandatory 
savings plan could not succeed during the 1990s if proposed and debated in 
isolation,  It might, however,  succeed as part of an overhaul of Medicare  or 
Social Security, or as part of a new approach to universal health care (which 
might come sometime early in the twenty-first century). 
Education 
Primary and secondary education in the United States remains centered in a 
publicly organized system of schools, almost entirely run at the local level and 
financed mostly through local and state taxes. As we have seen, institutional 
investments made long ago within U.S.  federal democracy (rather than consid- 
erations of economic or social “efficiency” in the mid-twentieth century) have 
made the public educational system what it is today. This is true, even though 
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ably eroded by  the growth of secular private schools catering to the children 
of privileged middle-class professionals living in urban areas. The opting-out 
of certain upper-middle-class  parents has no doubt reduced support for public 
school taxation. Yet financial allocation to public schools has, in the aggregate, 
grown steadily in recent decades, so it is hard to argue that American  public 
schools are starved for funds. 
Current ideas about “school  reform”  focus on  organizational incentives 
rather than money as such. They range from proposals for empowering princi- 
pals and teachers in individual schools, through plans for promoting competi- 
tion among public schools within local areas, to calls for tax-financed vouchers 
that would enable parents to choose among public schools or (even) between 
public and private schools. Whatever their conceptual merits, such proposals 
have very different possibilities from a polity-centered perspective. Given the 
existing institutional arrangements within-or  against-which  reforms would 
have to be enacted and implemented, it seems very unlikely that Americans 
will  suddenly  decide to  totally  scrap public  schools in  favor  of  a  private, 
market-oriented  voucher system. Such a step would be seen by many voting 
citizens-and  portrayed  by  providers employed in the current public  school 
system-as  little more than a vast tax subsidy to parents who are now paying 
for private schooling in addition to paying taxes for public schools. More pub- 
lic money  would have to be raised and spent at a time when Americans are 
highly sensitive about raising taxes. 
Reforms that rearrange administration or financing within the public school 
system seem much more likely, however, because U.S.  public opinion  is in- 
creasingly  aware that  there are problems with the quality  of  school perfor- 
mance.  Significant  rearrangements-including  vouchers  for  public  school 
“choice”-are  being enacted within particular states or localities. If they prove 
attractive in politically visible ways-by  lowering school-related tax costs and 
or improving  the educational performance of  schools-such  reforms  could 
then spread by “competitive emulation” across many localities and states. That 
was the way  that America’s commitment to public  schooling originally grew 
up in the nineteenth century: not from the top down at the behest of the national 
bureaucratic or professional elites, but from the bottom laterally through com- 
petitive emulation across many localities. I would expect school reform to hap- 
pen again in this manner, to the degree that there are any significant modifica- 
tions in the status quo. 
Child Care 
Child care represents  a politically  conceivable  new  area for significantly 
expanded public  financing in the United  States, but probably  not for direct 
provision of child care services by the federal government. Over the past sev- 
eral decades, U.S. women’s labor-force participation  has increased markedly, 
including the employment of mothers of infants and toddlers as well as school- 
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rise; about half of all American children born today can expect to spend sig- 
nificant portions of their minority in single-parent (usually mother-led) house- 
holds (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994). Such social trends increase the poten- 
tial social demand for, and economic relevance of, preschool and after-school 
child care. Yet these trends are playing out in a U.S. polity that currently does 
less through government to provide  for, or to finance, child care than many 
European nations do currently, or have done historically. 
From the late nineteenth century through the 1950s, many conservative or 
social democratic nations in Europe got into the child care business for essen- 
tially demographic reasons, to ensure high enough birth rates to sustain labor 
forces and populations of potential military recruits (Bock and Thane 1991). 
As a country of immigration, and a nation in privileged  geopolitical circum- 
stances, the  United  States did  not worry  as much  about encouraging  more 
births or more labor-force participation by mothers. Such child care subsidies 
as the United States developed historically were mainly centered in the welfare 
system. Mothers’ pensions from the  1910s, federalized as ADC/AFDC from 
the 1930s, encouraged impoverished widows or single mothers to care for their 
children  in  the home, while remaining  at least partly  outside  of  the wage- 
labor market. 
Because of these historical legacies, any debates about new US. child care 
policies for the  1990s are inevitably tied up with the contentious politics of 
“welfare reform”-yet  another round of which is currently under way. For rea- 
sons that I discussed above, a new consensus has emerged among most experts 
and citizens, an agreement that stay-at-home motherhood should no longer be 
subsidized for the poor. According to proposals form the Clinton administra- 
tion  and congressional  Republicans, AFDC is supposed to be turned into a 
program  promoting  paid-labor-force  participation  by  impoverished  single 
mothers. At the same time, children’s advocates are arguing that any state or 
national legislation to limit welfare benefits and move single mothers into the 
low-wage labor force must be accompanied  by  the substantial expansion of 
public provision of, or subsidies for, day care services, including those offered 
through the Head Start program. As Arleen Leibowitz explains in her contribu- 
tion to this volume, less-privileged children might well benefit from expanded 
day care services in terms of cognitive development and social skills that pre- 
pare them to do better in school. But it remains to be seen whether legislators 
and the American voting public will be willing to pay the cost of such expanded 
social services for the poor alone. In past historical episodes of “welfare re- 
form,” the end result has been to spend less on the poor and coerce them more. 
And indeed, very conservative Republicans today argue that welfare benefits 
should simply be cut off and children placed in orphanages if single mothers 
will not or cannot find work to sustain their offspring. 
Given recent family changes, coupled with Americans’ long-term proclivity 
for universal rather than poverty benefits, there might well be a broad potential 
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true particularly for nonbureaucratic and noninvasive financial transfers, such 
as refundable  tax credits, or vouchers available to all families, or enhanced 
dependent allowances delivered through the tax system. Broad financial trans- 
fers could be designed  to deliver proportionately  more  aid to lower-income 
families, while leaving choices about specific types of care to families them- 
selves. But the more universal the system, the more costly it would be in terms 
of tax revenues. Because of the current fiscal and political climate in the United 
States, electoral politicians will probably not promote the discussion of univer- 
sal child care subsidies, no matter how acute the social needs may be. Debate 
for the foreseeable future is likely to remain focused on poor mothers and their 
children. Only after the next round of “welfare reform” is completed is it likely 
that U.S. politics can begin to focus on more fundamental issues of how to 
support all American families in a world where paid employment and parental 
duties must be combined in very new ways than in the pre-1970s past. 
Elsewhere  (Skocpol 1991) I have advocated  a set of family  security  pro- 
grams aimed at working-age adults and their children-the  groups that are not 
well served by existing social programs, Family security measures would in- 
clude universal basic health care financing of some sort, job training available 
to displaced  or potential  employees across  the  class structure,  benefits  for 
working parents,  and assured  support for single-parent  families. These pro- 
grams could be financed in part by the transfer of resources now spent on other 
social programs,  including  welfare.  New taxes would also be required, and 
they could include a consumption tax (such as discussed in Fuchs  1994) as 
well as payroll  deductions from absent parents  for child  support (Garfinkel 
1992). If  history is any guide, American  citizens might conceivably be more 
supportive of relatively universal family security measures  than they  are of 
social programs targeted on the poor alone. 
Nevertheless, given the electoral and institutional deadlocks that plague the 
U.S. national government right now, it is an open question whether any new 
programs  that include  taxes could be enacted by  Congress,  even if rational 
proposals were to be devised by federal officials or extragovernmental experts. 
New U.S. social programs to enhance the security of  the elderly, of children, 
and indeed of all American families will never come about until both intellec- 
tuals and politicians start to talk about the socioeconomic functions, as well as 
dysfunctions, of taxes. The U.S. federal state has nearly reached the limits of 
what it can constructively accomplish through regulation and mandatts in the 
absence of stable new sources of public revenue. 
American citizens might, or might not, respond to new, wide-ranging discus- 
sions about the uses of tax revenues for supporting the young, the old, and 
working-age families in the middle. Yet it is certain that the citizenry will not 
respond unless they begin to hear thoughtful arguments and nonideological 
debates that encompass all sides of the issue. What do Americans want local, 
state, and national governments to do to cushion insecurities  for families at 
various phases of the life cycle? How should governments act in partnership 334  Theda Skocpol 
with citizens and businesses and providers of social services? And who will 
pay-in  part, through taxes-for  what we decide we want? Social scientists 
should enter this sort of broad democratic conversation, not just as designers of 
efficient “policy instruments,” but also as citizens conversing with their fellows 
about the kind of good government and society we want for the twenty-first 
century. 
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Comment  Seymour Martin Lipset 
Many discussions of American public policy in a comparative context suggest, 
as Theda Skocpol notes in her paper, that the United States has been a “welfare 
laggard,” or as some others have put it, an outlier among the developed indus- 
trial democracies. Much of Skocpol’s previous work has raised questions as to 
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how valid this generalization is. In her book Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: 
The Political Origins of  Social Policy in the United States and other writings, 
she has noted that the United States adopted important welfare policies about 
the same time as a number of European countries. The earliest was the provis- 
ions for benefits for Civil War veterans and their families, which began in the 
last part of the nineteenth century and continued into the twentieth. Since the 
overwhelming majority of adult males in the North served in the Union Army, 
this meant that a very large proportion of the population outside of the South 
was covered. These benefits included old-age pensions, dealt with health prob- 
lems, and provided for support of widows and children. As noted, the timing 
corresponded with the introduction of welfare programs in various European 
nations, such as those fostered by Disraeli in Britain and Bismarck in Germany. 
The second early American  program  to which  Skocpol has called  attention 
involved various maternalist  measures mainly on the state levels, which pro- 
vided benefits for mothers and children. 
These programs demonstrate that Americans in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth  centuries  were  willing  to  pay  for  welfare  programs  for  specific 
groups. Yet these do not, in my judgment, negate the conclusion that the United 
States was and remains a welfare laggard. The veterans’ benefits were given as 
recompense for service in the army during wartime, not as a right for all citi- 
zens or in order to redistribute income or as an entitlement. The program, as 
Skocpol indicates, did not set a precedent for the extension of welfare benefits 
to the rest of the population. Advocates of such policies, who tried to use the 
veterans’ benefits as a model, failed. 
The maternalist policies do correspond somewhat to latter-day, or contem- 
porary, welfare programs. They were fostered by middle-class women, active 
in the feminist or suffragette movements. They were concerned with the prob- 
lems of children of single mothers, largely of widows and divorced women. 
These policies also did not last, ending either around the time of World War I 
or, in the case of the one federal program, in the 1920s. Like Civil War Veter- 
ans’ benefits, they did not serve as a model or precedent for federal policies. 
There was, it should be noted, a third early set of policies that had definite 
roots in American values and that has continued into later times: support for 
education. If the United  States has been  a welfare  laggard,  it has been  the 
educational leader with respect to expenditures and coverage for the different 
age groups, reflecting the country’s greater commitment to equality of opportu- 
nity. From early in the nineteenth century, America led the world with respect 
to attendance at elementary school, then with high school, and finally in more 
recent times with the proportions of the age cohort going to college and gradu- 
ate school. For each level of education at any given moment in time there have 
been more people studying in the United States than in Europe. And Ameri- 
cans have been willing to pay for the costs involved. This emphasis on educa- 
tion continues down to the present. A review of public opinion data over fifty 
years by Ben Page and Robert Shapiro (1992, 128) notes that “education has 338  Theda Skocpol 
long been an area in which most Americans want government to spend more 
money.” The most recent  data on governmental expenditures  reveal that the 
United States is still behind most developed countries with respect to welfare, 
but not to education. 
There have, of course been major changes in the preferences of Americans 
since the 1930s. The Great Depression and the New Deal led to an American 
welfare state including Social Security, unemployment insurance, and various 
entitlement  and transfer programs, such as AFDC, Medicare,  and Medicaid. 
But as noted, comparative data still show that the United States has not caught 
up to the European countries. The proportion of the gross national product that 
Americans pay in terms of taxes per capita is the lowest in the developed world. 
Why the United States lags may be dealt with historically and comparatively. 
On one hand, many historians and, I think, Theda Skocpol prefer to answer the 
question historically  or situationally. And they have pointed to past American 
movements in support of greater state intervention for more welfare. It is true 
that there has been interest in welfare programs and statist economic policies, 
but it is also true the advocates of these policies have had less success here 
than elsewhere, that they have failed repeatedly,  as with the recent effort to 
extend health coverage. 
The analysis of American behavior in the welfare area may be linked to the 
discussions of Why no socialism in the United States? The “why no socialism” 
debates refer to the fact that the United States is the only industrialized country 
that  has  not  had  a  significant  socialist or labor party.  The subject  must be 
treated cross-nationally.  (To this may be added the fact that today America is 
close to having the weakest trade union movement among industrialized coun- 
tries in terms of the proportion of the labor force who belong.) The discussion 
has been particularly important for Marxist theory, as well as politics, since 
Karl Marx stated explicitly in Capital that the most developed country shows 
to the less developed the image of their future, that political  systems are a 
function of the level of technology of economies. What this meant to Marxists 
prior to World War  I was that the United  States, as the most economically 
advanced  country,  would  be  the  first  socialist  country.  Various  prominent 
Marxists assumed this would happen. As it became clear that the United States 
was not behaving properly, they became very concerned about the implications 
the lack of a socialist movement in the United States had for the validity of 
Marxist theory. The subject, of course, has been addressed by many nonsocial- 
ists and has been researched by academic scholars. 
Those who have written on the issue have suggested many explanatory vari- 
ables, in fact so many that the outcome seems overdetermined. One of the most 
interesting sets of hypotheses was advanced  by  H. G. Wells in  1906 in  The 
Future in America and elaborated on by the American political theorist Louis 
Hartz in The Liberal Tradition in America, published in 1955. Wells and Hartz 
emphasized  the impact of the dominant ideology or creed, of America’s or- 
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liberalism, now sometimes referred to as libertarianism, favors a weak govern- 
ment, is suspicious of or fears the state. It subsumes Jefferson’s dictum, that 
government is best which governs least. This antistatist doctrine defines the 
conservative or national tradition of the United States. Conversely, in Europe 
and Canada the dominant organizing principles  have been  statist. Conserva- 
tism in many of these countries has meant Toryism, an emphasis on mercantil- 
ism, a powerful activist state, elitism, noblesse oblige, and communitarianism. 
Harold Macmillan, who served as a Tory prime minister of Britain, defined 
Toryism, the ideology of his branch of the Conservative Party, as “paternalistic 
socialism.” The argument derivative from Wells and Hartz suggests that, where 
national traditions legitimate statism, both the egalitarian left and the hierarchi- 
cal right endorse welfare policies. Europe produced a statist right and a statist 
left, while the liberals, squeezed between them, were the politically weak back- 
ers of antistatist ideology and policies. In America, Wells argued, two parties 
were missing, the  socialists and the conservatives. He contended as of  1906 
that both American major parties would be wings of the Liberal Party in Brit- 
ain, the left and the right. 
In various writings in Canada and the United States, I have emphasized, as 
have many Canadian scholars, that Canada is the country of the countenevolu- 
tion, which, retaining the monarchy and state-related church, produced respect 
for the mercantilist  state, while the United  States is the country of the Whig 
revolution,  and therefore has been antistatist  and  classically  liberal  (Lipset 
1990). The different outcomes of the American Revolution produced varying 
receptivities  to state intervention.  Canada, though  never electing a socialist 
party to national office, has two, the New Democrats (NDP), and the separatist 
Parti Qukbkcois (PQ), which have been strong in most of its provinces. Four, 
Manitoba, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia, have been governed 
by  the NDP; Quebec has a PQ government. And the country has been much 
more receptive to welfare state measures than the United States. Brian Mulro- 
ney,  who served as Conservative prime minister  for most of the  1980s, de- 
scribed the welfare state as Canada’s “sacred heritage”  in the  1988 election 
campaign. His successor, Kim Campbell, who held office briefly after Mulro- 
ney retired,  noted that Canada is basically  a social democratic  country. The 
leader of what has sometimes been described as the Reaganite right in Canada, 
Preston Manning, of the Reform Party, said in 1994 that Canadians owe a debt 
of gratitude to the social democrats of the country, the NDP, who are respon- 
sible for Canada’s health plan, its system of family allowances, its more exten- 
sive provisions for the unemployed than the American, and many other welfare 
measures. Clearly the orientation of Canada toward welfare policies is quite 
different from that of Republicans.  The latter are the only major anti-statist 
party in the developed world. 
This brief comparative  look does not mean  that Skocpol is wrong in her 
analyses, or in her contention that there has been considerable support for so- 
cial welfare policies in the United States. She prefers to explain their relative 340  Theda Skocpol 
weakness as the outcome of specific conflicts and political processes. She is 
basically correct on the details. But she underplays what I consider to be im- 
portant, namely, that the larger value context within which American politics 
takes place makes it much more difficult to institutionalize statist economic 
and welfare policies here than in Europe and Canada. It does not make it im- 
possible. As Gerhard Casper emphasized in his talk to our conference, America 
has an extensive regulatory state, one that is stronger than those in most social 
democratic systems and in Canada. Where Europeans and Canadians choose 
direct state intervention, ownership or control  of industry, and redistributive 
policies to produce more equality  of  result, Americans  favor education  and 
regulation to enhance equality of opportunity and a more competitive society. 
I would contend that the regulatory emphases are also related to the greater 
moralistic streak in American society. This orientation derives in some consid- 
erable part from the fact that this country is the only Protestant sectarian na- 
tion, Methodist, Baptist, and a myriad of others. The Euro-Canadian hierarchi- 
cal churches, Catholic, Anglican, Orthodox, Lutheran, which have been state- 
related, not only have contributed to statist orientations in their countries but 
also have made them much less moralistic and individualistic than the United 
States, with its congregationally organized sectarian denominations. 
The Wells and Hartz approach does not account for the success or failure of 
any particular policy effort or the strength of different ideologies in the United 
States, Canada, or other countries. There are other important factors that I do 
not have the time or space to deal with, particularly the varying political sys- 
tems; divided government; checks and balances; president and Congress; weak 
executive authority compared to the more unified, parliamentary strong execu- 
tive  polity;  and  the  different  stratification  systems,  one  postfeudal  with 
stronger, more visible social classes and the other a product of a new revolu- 
tionary  society with  less consequent  deference  for elites and the state. The 
American  sociopolitical  system favors  limited  government, the  European  a 
strong state. But it is necessary to analyze specific differences through detailed 
historical case studies. And this is what Skocpol has done thoroughly and elo- 
quently. I would simply urge the need for both comparative cultural and struc- 
tural analyses as well. 
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